Stability or democracy: on the role of monitors, media and miracles by Kessel,W.M.J.van
3 Stability or Democracy: on
the Role of Monitors,
Media and Miracles
I. van Kessel
INTRODUCTION'
The Interventionist mood of the 1990s has spawned new breeds
of development-funded travellers to Africa. Aid workers and
development consultants have been joined by peace-keeping
armies, police trainers, officials of political parties, peace mon-
itors, election observers - to name just of few of the new agents
sent out to assist African states in transition processes towards
a more democratie mode of governancc. This is by and large a
new type of involvement in political processes in Africa. There
are as vet few rules: the new roles are not clearly defined.
These new types of role-players often have only a vague notion
of what they are supposed to achieve. They are sometimes de-
ployed in several capacities which may shift over time, thus
adding to a blurring of their responsibilities. Nor is it always
clear who sets the agenda for various types of international
involvement.
In this chapter, I will argue that a clear demarcation of the
role and responsibility of peace monitors and election observers
is in the interest of both stability and democracy and that some
duties, notably the monitoring of democratization as a long-
term process, are best left to local actors. The last part of this
chapter will therefore focus on the role of independent media
as monitors of democracy and, in a broader sense, as agents of
democratization.
What is the role of international election monitors? To
monitor the elections, report irregularities and deliver a con-
sidered judgement on the 'free and fair'-ness of the elections?
And - by their presence - inspire confidence in the democratie
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process? Or do election monitors have a wider responsibility? Is
the monitor also the guardian of stability? What if the require-
ments of truthful reporting on the elections are at odds with
the perceived need for political stability? From a basically tech-
nical exercise meant to check on correct procedures and to
promote a 'levelling of the playing field', election monitoring
has evolved towards a political signal, involving a nod of
approval or disapproval from donor-countries. What if prioriti-
zation of stability undermines the credibility of election moni-
toring? Does election monitoring serve its purpose if the reports
of monitoring missions are inspired by the political agenda of
donor-countries?
On the other hand, democratization involves much more
than the regulär ritual of multiparty elections.2 Recent African
history is littered with flawed and often deliberately manipu-
lated elections. We don't nced the 1933 elections in Germany to
remind us that multiparty elections do not necessarily signal a
democratie process. If other conditions - notably the rule of law
-are absent, elections may not result in democratie governance
but in a consolidation of authoritarian rule, under which the
losers of the electoral contest remain excluded from the politi-
cal process. A verdict on the technical correctncss of the elec-
tions has no bearing on the democratie content of the political
process.
In the first part of this chapter, I will argue that the duties of
election observers should not be compounded with the respons-
ibilities of peace monitors. If there is a role for international
monitoring of African elections, it should be with a clear and
limited mandate. To illustrate my argument, I will use the 1994
South African elections as an example of diffuse and overlap-
ping patterns of responsibility of international actors.
On the eve of the elections, South Africa was in the grip of
fear of violent conflagration. But during the long days of a mo-
. tnentous but extremely chaotic election, the voting exercise was
transformed into a 'small miracle', to quote president Nelson
Mandela. Both in populär memory and in diplomatic discourse,
the South African elections and the transitional arrangements
on power-sharing have become a model which is held up as an
example for other African countries. But a model of what,
exactly?
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SOUTH AFRICA: FROM NIGHTMARE SCENARIO TO
MODEL
International observers in South Africa have served in the role
of peace monitor, election observer and 'monitor of democracy'
with a long-term engagement. By all accounts, South Africa's
first democratie election in 1994 was the most monitored elec-
tion ever. From the second half of 1992, substantial numbers of
observers from the United Nations, the European Community
and the Organization of African Unity, and later from the
Commonwealth as well, began arriving in South Africa. Over a
period of one and a half years, these organizations deployed
2,513 observers in South Africa, in addition to domestic ob-
servers and observers from foreign NGOs (Anglin 1995: 525).
Their initial task was to assist in bringing an end to the viol-
ence and to create conditions for negotiations, as a preliminary
to the ultimate purpose of promoting conditions conducive to
free and fair elections. Subsequently, their mandate was ex-
panded to include the observation of the election itself. The ra-
tionale for having international observers was that by their
mere presence they contribute to a climate conducive to free
political participation. Anglin argues that in the case of South
Africa, observers sometimes played a useful role as mediators
during marches or mass gatherings with a potential for
violence. Peace-keeping activities were indeed within the ex-
panded mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission to
South Africa (UNOMSA), as cstablished by Security Council
resolution 894 in 1994, which referred to 'activities relating to
peace promotion and the reduction of violence'.
But the dramatic decline in violence in the final week of the
campaign had little to do with the huge influx of observers
(Anglin 1995: 535). That the election itself took place in an at-
mosphere of relative peace was due to the fact that the
Freedom Front and the Inkatha Freedom Party, two political
parties with the most potential for violent disruption, had at
the last minute decided to participate in the polls. As the elec-
tion date drew nearer, new contingents of observers kept
Streaming in. Their mandate was not only to assess the elec-
tions, but also to determine whether the rules of the game
werc conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. Among
their many responsibilities was the monitoring of domestic
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monitors, notably the Election Monitoring Directorate of the
Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media
Commission and the police. In briefing sessions, a strong
message was hammered into the observers: so much was at
stake in South Africa's first democratie elections that this exer-
cise could not be allowed to fail. The consequences of failure
would be too ghastly to contemplate.
During this period, the international missions worked closely
with the South African Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC). The IEC was installed only in December 1993 and was
thus left with precious littlc time to organize this vast Opera-
tion. In the preparatory phase, the international observers
pointed out inadequacies and offered advice on more adequate
procedures. In their final reports after the elections, they dif-
fered on some important points with the IEC. While the IEC
declared the elections 'substantially free and fair', these words
werc conspicuously lacking from the joint statement of the in-
ternational missions. They concludcd that the people of South
Africa had indeed been able to participate freely in the voting
and that 'the outcorne of the elections reflects the will of the
people of South Africa' (United Nations 1994: 22-5).
Both UNOMSA and the European Union Election Unit noted
some glaring deficiencies. These ranged from a shortage of
ballot papers in the polling stations to unofficial transport of
ballot boxes to the ncver explained tampering with the com-
puter program used to accumulate the results in the central
results unit of the IEC's head office. Results now had to be to-
talled with a manual system, leading to even more delays in a
week characterized by excruciatingly long waits. The final
reports of the EU mission and UNOMSA are in broad agrce-
ment in their praise for the spirit of compromise manifested by
the parties in the aftermath of the election, although they
differ on not insignificant matters such as the scale of irregular-
ities. While the EU declared that procedures were impeccable
in some 90 per cent of the voting stations (European Union
Election Unit 1994: ii), the UN reported that only '81.13 per
cent of voting stations [were] observed to bc applying proce-
dures correctly' (United Nations 1994: 81). It is not clear
whether this substantial discrcpancy was caused by more vigi-
lance on the part of the UN observers or by a more lenient
Interpretation of the rules in the EU camp.
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The EU report regretted the inadequate logistics and the
'non-transparent process of dispute settling', which was done by
party officials without the prescnce of any international ob-
servers. But it went on to state that 'nevertheless, the parties
agreed without major reservations to accept the election results
as they were proclaimed, and all political quarters seem to bc
content with it' (Europcan Union Election Unit 1994: 81). The
EU mission did, however, not evade the crucial question:
acceptancc by all parties is not necessarily the same as free and
fair elections. 'Whilst the final results may be plausible, sheer
plausibility is not satisfactory for observers. Since the election
results have not yet been presented in sufficient detail it is not
possible to asscss to what extent the result is not only plausible
but correct and thus fair '(European Union Election Unit 1994:
81).
The UN report equally acknowledged that the elections were
far from perfect. It expressed severe criticism of the inadequate
planning in the pre-election phase. But in spite of these 'sys-
temic problems' (United Nations 1994: 23) and 'evidence of ir-
regularities' in the counting process (ibid.: 29), the report
concluded with praise for the consensus which was maintained
throughout the process. 'Fortunately, the perseverance and
spirit of compromise that prevailed in the negotiations was sus-
tained. The political parties demonstrated remarkable maturity
and responsibility, thus helping to achieve an overall accept-
able, credible result. This is one of the great lessons to be
drawn from the whole South African process of change' (ibid.:
39). From this phrase, it is not quite clear what the lesson
entails exactly: in case the electorale produces an 'unaccept-
able' result, would it then be up to the parties to help achieve
an overall acccptable outcome? Did the outcome of the elec-
tions reflect 'the will of the people' or 'the will of the parties'?
In view of the broad mandate of the observer missions, which
included peace-kceping as well as election monitoring, it is un-
derstandable that the reports address both the issue of political
stability and the fairness of the election. But this broad
mandate results in a blurring of responsibilities. An unhcalthy
confusion reigns between the acceptability of party deals in the
interest of stability and the basic meaning of elections, which
are after all held to establish the preferences of the citizens by
counting their votes. As peace monitors, international agents
can support an arrangement between parties which is likely to
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maintain the peace. As election observers, they are supposed to
monitor that the 'will of the people' is identified by counting
their votes, rather than by non-transparent deals between party
bosses. If the international missions have sent a signal to South
Africa that the outcome of elections can be settled in a deal
between parties, then thcy have left a legacy which does not
augur well for future elections.
In evaluating the largest exercise of its kind in UN history,
the UN report is rather self-congratulatory on the impact of the
peace-keeping role by the observers deployed by the interna-
tional Community. 'As an exercise in preventive diplomacy,
drawing on the strengths of several organizations to support in-
digenous efforts towards peace and national reconciliation, the
international community's efforts in South Africa since 1992
offer a unique and positive demonstration of the benefits of
such cooperation' (United Nations 1994: 38). It could have
worked out less beneficially. During the instruction sessions for
UN observers on short-term assignment for the election week,
more attention was given to safety precautions and evacuation
procedures than to the technicalities of the election and the
fine points of the political contest. This resulted in an atmos-
phere of heightened anxiety among the observers, many of
whom came ill-prepared and already feeling insecure in an un-
familiar environment. One shudders to think what the effects
of a stampede of election observers towards their designated
evacuation points would have been on the stability of South
Africa.
Anglin equally believes that the international observers were
most effective in their role as peace monitors. He stipulates
that the role of election observers was modest: the major contri-
bution of the international observers was, in fact, as peace mon-
itors during the preccding year and a half (Anglin 1995: 541).
The outcome was accepted because the political parties agreed
to acquiesce in the published results, not because of the verdict
of the observers on the validity of the elections.
A MODEL OF WHAT?
This account raises some interesting questions. Are the roles of
peace monitor and election observer mutually interchangeable?
And why and how did the political parties in South Africa, in
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spite of glaring flaws, come to accept the published results? The
South African transition was based on a series of compromises
between political elites. While the political culture of the con-
frontational phase of anti-apartheid resistance in the 1980s had
celebrated the importance of populär participation, the reality
of the 1990s dictated that parties in the long negotiation
process became skilied in damage control and conflict Contain-
ment. This is perfectly understandable and acceptable. As
Steven Friedman noted: 'Whatever the costs of the secret deal-
making, manipulation and manoeuvring which lay at the centre
of the negotiation process, it yielded benefits whose merits
would not have to be explained to the inhabitants of Bosnia,
Rwanda or Northern Ireland' (Friedman 1994: 336).
So far, so good. But in the euphoria following Nelson
Mandela's inauguration, a flawed election was transformed into
a model. A model of what? Of democracy or of consensus, com-
promise and conciliation?
I share the relief and the joy about the miracle which
launched South Africa towards a common future of freedom
and equal opportunities. My only concern is that we should be
clear about what happened. I do not dispute that in certain situ-
ations peace and stability are more important considerations
than the proper conduct of multi-party elections - as long as we
do not confuse these notions, because that is doing democracy a
disservice. If stability is the supreme concern, the international
Community should limit itself to sending peace monitors rather
than election observers. The South African experience with
negotiated power-sharing might hold interesting lessons for
other countries. But the negotiated election should rather
remain a unique miracle, and not be advertised as a model to
be emulated.
The questions addressed above are of course not unique to
the South African Situation, as dcmonstrated in various other
chapters of this book, notably those on Ethiopia and Ghad. Is
election monitoring predominantly a technical exercise to
check whether the rules have been applied consistently? Or is it
a political gesture, meant to bestow legitimacy on the govern-
ment which emerges from these elections? Do observers have
other responsibilities beyond their mandate as election ob-
servers? Two contending positions emerge from the body of
policy papers and articles on the subject. The pragmatic view,
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ILften held by policy-makers and officials of foreign governments
Ld embassies, emphasizes the observers' responsibility for po-
Krical stability in the host country. What would happen if they
declared the elections invalid? Even if conditions do not fully
v satisfv elementary requiremcnts of democracy, election obser-
k Nation can still contribute to the political stability which is vital
for the further development of the democratization process.
l This process requires dynamic criteria rather than absolute
standards. Even imperfect elections, it is argued, have been
seful as a mechanism to bestow legitimacy on new rulers who
t least move in the right direction, as in Tanzania.
The other view, prevalent among journalists and academies
|in the West, argues that the application of double Standards
fWOUld make the whole exercise of questionablc validity.
Moreover, Africans themselves time and again insist on stnct
feriteria and feel cheated when told that their democracy ought
Robe measured against a special set of rules. Third World coun-
.'tfïes apparently deserve Third World democracies. If the
«•wrdict 'unfree and unfair' is excluded from the very beginning
[tof the monitoring mission, then what is the point of the exer-
'öse? If stability is the primary concern, then why bother with
üjlection observers? Election observers should not be confused
th peace monitors: that will put the credibility of the whole
stitution of election monitoring at stake. Limiting the
arnage should not amount to legitimizing a government
äoijtenhuijs 1997).
r, The South African case differs, however, in some respects
from other questionable elections. No party feit cheated out of
fyictory. On the contrary, the phase of negotiations had produced
" m inclusive formula for the transition period up to the next
„ections in 1999. Any party with at least 20 per cent of the vote
fcwas entitled to have a vice-presidcnt; all parties with at least
flö per cent were entitled to ministerial posts in the
ff Government of National Unity. These 'sunset' clauses meant
the National Party was spared a total eclipse: with 20.3 per
P cent of the vote, the National Party was entitled to one of the
fUtwo vice-presidential posts. With 10.5 per cent of the vote,
|Inkatha entered the cabinet with three ministers. In the post-
l'election euphoria, president Nelson Mandela became ever more
f generous, offering ministerial posts even to parties which had
loot made the 10 per cent mark. However, the true miracle was
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not the elections, but the spirit of compromise and conciliation,
which all of a sudden had descended on this polarized, violence-
ridden country. Stability in South Africa was preserved not
because of the carefully worded verdict of the international ob-
servers, who to their credit have not glossed over the irregular-
ities, but because the parties had decided not to contest the
results. A negotiated election result seemed the logical conclu-
sion to the negotiated revolution which rested on consensus
arrangements between the major players.
Even in official documents, it became fashionable to hail the
South African elections as a miracle. The EU report stated that
'given South Africa's history of racial discrimination and op-
pression, its massive problems of poverty and unemployment,
and the tragically high levels of violence, the success of the elec-
tion is little less than miraculous' (European Union Election
Unit 1994: vi). Once the miracle was proclaimed, few doubting
Thomases were willing to express their doubts publicly for fear
of being branded spoilers of a singular success story. While the
observers flew back home to spread the legend of the miracle,
newspaper verdicts on the outcome remained more down to
earth.
MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MIRACLE
'No one will ever know if the result is an accurate reflection of
the will of the South African people; indeed, if it is so, it is prob-
ably by accident', commented the Financial Times on the 'de-
signer outcome' which bore such a conspicuous resemblance to
the ideal outcome (Financial Times, 7-8 May 1994). The chair-
man of the IEC, justice Johann Kriegler, had set the tone when
hè cancelled the required procedure of conciliating the inven-
tory of the ballot boxes with the records of the electoral officers,
with the commandment that the election was 'about national
reconciliation, not ballot reconciliation' (the Guardian, 3 May
1994). Like everybody else, Guardian correspondent David
Beresford was duly impressed with the wave of goodwill which
had suddenly swamped the country, but he did not confuse the
miracle with a democratie election. 'C'est magnifique, mais ce
n'est pas la democratie' was bis paraphrase borrowed from a
French general in the Crimean war, to describe the miracle
The Role of Monitors, Media and Miracles 59
which had taken on a truly religious dimension. The reports
and the editorials in the Weekly Mail and Guardian provided a
clearer picture of the South African elections than the official
reports of the observer missions. This fiercely independent left-
liberal South African weekly told the stories of the stuffing of
ballot boxes, the setting up of 'pirate' polling stations and the
issuing of voter cards to under age youths. When complaints
from all parties kept piling up, the whole exercise threatened to
end in disaster. In a series of local deals, party officials decided
to cut a deal rather than challenge the outcome. The IEG gave
its blessing 'in the national interest'. Challenged on the legality
of the horse-trading, chairman Kriegler said: 'Come now, come
now, let's not get purist, let's not be overly squeamish. They are
in a power game with one another and if they want to settle by
withdrawing objections, that's fine. There is nothing wrong eth-
ically or legally' (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 6-12 May 1994). The
Weekly Mail concluded that the manipulated election result
reflected what the major parties agreed they should have
achieved at the polls in some regions. Most controversial werc
the results in KwaZulu-Natal, where Inkatha emerged victori-
ous with a majority of one seat in the provincial assembly and a
national percentage poll of 10.5 per cent.
While the media were digging into the less savoury aspects of
the miraculous elections, the international observers returned
home to find that the miraclc had created a worldwide commu-
nity of believers who longed to join in the celebration rather
than be disturbed by questions about behind-the-scene deals.
In their debriefing session with the Foreign Ministry, Dutch
observers with the various missions manifested both pride with
the happy ending and a certain uncasiness with the horse deals.
Observers who had served in KwaZulu-Natal found it particu-
larly galling that people had gone to great lengths and had
sometimes demonstrated great courage in the exercise of their
vote, only to find that the bosses had made a deal behind their
backs. Mr Job de Ruijter, a former Dutch minister who headed
the observer delegation of the European Union, admitted that
thcrc had been a non-transparent network of decision-making
and that backroom deals had influenced the results, but stated
that all of this was well within the IEG mandate. However, in
his public statements hè was less outspoken, which is perhaps
indicative of a certain uneasiness with the shady sides of the
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miracle. In a public lecture some weeks later, hè backtracked on
his earlier statement, denying that some outcomes had been
fixed in backroom deals and painting a picture of a more or less
model election. He now offered a new and simple explanation
for Inkatha's felicitous results: 'You must remember, there are a
tremendous lot of Zulus in Natal.'3 Such a reference to the irra-
tional tribal nature of African politics is usually sufficient to
satisfy an unsuspecting audience. While assuming that Zulus
have some primordial predisposition to vote for Inkatha, this
'explanation' conveniently skips the basic fact that the contest
in Natal was not between Zulus and other ethnic groups, but
between Inkatha loyalists and ANC loyalists, nearly all of whom
were Zulus.
The Weekly Mail had a more plausible explanation: faced with
the choice between 'Bloodshed or Buthelezi', the ANC decided
not to-push its allegations of fraud beyond a point of no return.
After a personal plea by Nelson Mandela, ANC leaders in
KwaZulu-Natal dropped their plans to challenge the election
results in court. Acknowledging the temptation to join in
the celebrations and to 'go along with a cover up of the
Independent Electoral Commission's performance', the Weekly
Mail pronounced nevcrtheless a harsh verdict: 'By last weekend,
Judge Kriegler had to admit that hè had to throw aside the
rules, the safeguards and what few Systems he had in place just
to get out some sort of result. By Wednesday afternoon, hè had
to acknowledge that counting accuracy and care had given way
to horse-trading among the parties. He had ceased to be a
judge, ruling on the accuracy and validity of the result, but ... a
mediator, desperately negotiating a result that all parties would
accept' (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 6-12 May 1994).
Both in journalistic and academie writing on the elections,
different views have been expressed on the role of the IEC and
its chairman. While some believe that the IEC was part of the
deal, the predominant view was that it acquiesced in a series of
deals concluded by the parties. The IEC then went along with
their 'consensus results'. Kriegler argued that his mandate was
not to ensure that the results were accurate, but that the
process was free and fair. If the political parties wanted to
horse-tradc over disputed ballots, that was their business (Africa
Confidential, 20 May 1994). Summarizing the election experi-
encc in KwaZulu-Natal, Hamilton and Mare concluded:
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It is not clear how far the votes attributed to parties in this
region are removed from the actual preferences and voices of
those who were treated so badly by the election machinery
and political parties, and who had borne the brunt of more
than a decade of violent confrontation. The published results
were a product of a trade-off between the competing parties.
Despite all attempts at creating transparency in the voting
process, the trade-off that characterized the final moments
of vote-counting in KwaZulu-Natal remains opaque. It is
widely assumed that the ANC's reluctant acceptance of the
results had to do with averting furthcr violence in the region.
The electorate is being asked to accept that disputes about ir-
regulär ballot boxes and allegations concerning the lack of
security in the transporting of boxes and the issuing of tem-
porary voter cards to under-age voters have been shelved,
perhaps only temporarily, by both the ANC and the IFP in an
attempt to normalize politics in the region. (Hamilton and
Mare 1994:86)
Neither the international observcrs nor the media have fully
exposed the inside story of the South African election. But the
media were at least more disccrning in distinguishing between
the rcquircments of stability and the demands of democracy.
The massive numbers of international observers performed a
useful service as guardians of stability, although this credit is
more due to long-term monitors than to the troops of observers
which arrived shortly bcfore the election. But the media did a
bctter job as watchdogs of democracy.
Peacc monitors or election observers: these hordes of interna-
tional watchdogs are in any case likely to be a passing phenome-
non. More sustainable is of course the building of local capacity.
Independent media - for all their faults - are most suitable for
the long-term role of watchdogs of democracy. In the last part
of this chapter, I thercfore turn to the role of media as monitors
of democracy.
MEDIA AS MONITORS OF DEMOCRACY
Media play a variety of rolcs as informers, educators and enter-
tainers of the public. Mass media provide information on public
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policy issues and provide a platform for discussion. Media help
empower their audience by making them aware of their civil
and political rights and by explaining how and why these rights
should be exercised.
With regard to elections, their role is to provide a platform
for political discussion in which the main issues are discussed
from various points of views, to enable political parties to
present their programmes to the electorale, to provide votcr
education in a more technical sense, and to monitor the
conduct of electoral campaigns and the elections themselves. In
the case of the South African elections, the media have been
praised for their constructive rolc, in spite of initial suspicions.
Much of the mainstream media in South Africa were widely rc-
garded as representing either the vested interests of the
National Party or of English-speaking big business. Suspicion
was particularly strong with regard to the South African
Broadcasting Corporation, long regarded as the mouthpiece of
the National Party. The transitional authority in South Africa
set up an Independent Media Commission (IMG) to ensurc
equitable treatment of all political parties by broadcasting ser-
vices and to ensurc that statc-financed publications and state
Information services were not used to advancc the interests of
any political party. The IMC found that the treatment of politi-
cal parties had been broadly equitable on radio and television.
Monitoring the press did not fall under the mandatc of the
IMC, but international observers and NGOs did monitor the
performance of the print media. UNOMSA stated that 'it is
safe to conclude that the print media contributed positively to
creating an atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections'
(United Nations 1994: 27). Significantly, a survey conducted by
the Independent Forum for Electoral Education found that
some 75 per cent of respondents depended on the print and
broadcast media for voter education (United Nations 1994: 27).
The EU mission had an equally positive judgement on the role
of the media.
This is an interesting verdict, because it contradicts the wide-
spread notion that media nccessarily function as their masters'
voicc. At first sight, the ANC was at a disadvantage in media
coveragc, because the liberation movement did not figure
among the newspaper tycoons. English-language newspapers
were traditionally supportive of big business and the Democratie
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Party, while the Afrikaans language dailies and weeklies were
vociferous supporters of the National Party. Only some weekly
papers with a fairly limited circulation, such as New Nation and
the Weekly Mail and Guardian, favoured the ANC. Nevertheless,
in all the main newspapers the ANC received by far the most
coverage, although not all coverage was sympathetic to the
movement. Editorial endorsements of the Democratie Party in
most of the English language papers had no visible effect on
voting patterns: the DP came out with a dismal 1.7 per cent of
the vote. News coverage largely ignored the Democratie Party
and focused on the main contenders, the ANC and the National
Party (Silke and Schrirc 1994). Editorial criteria on news value
werc apparently established in the relative autonomy of the
newsroom and not dictated in the boardrooms of the media con-
glomerates. Predictably, the white-owned but black circulation
Sowetan told its readers that 'the ANC and the PAC are the only
parties for whom our choice should be made' (Sowetan, 25 April
1994). This even-handed treatment of both liberation move-
ments could not stop the downfall of the Panafricanist
Congress, which ended up with 1.25 per cent of total votes.
At the time of the elections, broadcasting remaincd largely a
state monopoly. But to everybody's surprise, radio and television
coverage of the elcction period was remarkably balanced and
fair. In the case of the SABC, the growth to mature reporting
was no doubt helped by the guidelines and the monitoring by
the IMC (Silke and Schrire 1994: 128-9). The interesting lesson
of this experience remains that media can play a constructive
rolc both as educators of the public and as watchdogs on behalf
of the public, even if they are not regarded as unpartisan.
These favourable verdicts only indicatc that the South
African media were well behaved in the election period and
that they contributed to levelling the playing field without
giving undue advantage to one party. However, their role went
beyond fair reporting. As monitors of the elections they were as
vigilant as the international observer missions and certainly
more outspoken.
The verdict on the role of the press in African elections in
general is of course not universally favourable. Media coverage
of the 1995 general elections in Tanzania has come up for some
severe criticism. The Election Media Bulletin published by the
Association of Journalists and Media Workers described
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newspaper coverage as 'appalling', noting 'violation of profes-
sional ethics, malicious and outright lies, open bias, deliberate
misrepresentation and the failure to distinguish betwcen gov-
ernment function and campaign' (Richey and Ponte 1996: 83).
In Zimbabwe, which functions de facto as a one-party state, in-
dependent media, along with an independent judiciary, provide
some kind of countervailing power. Human rights organizations
have praised the role of the independent press in clection cover-
age. In a report on the 1995 parliamentary elections, the
human rights organization ZimRights found that 'the independ-
ent media, such as the Financial Gazette, the Sunday Gazette and
Horizon Magazine, generally related fair, unbiased and informa-
tive coverage to the public'. The governmcnt-owned media, on
the other hand, were 'demonstrably propagandistic, partisanly
belligerent, and lacked objectivity in their reporting and subject
matter. Since these are the only daily newspapers, this level of
propaganda was very damaging' (ZimRights 1995: 6).
Unlike international observers, media are continuously on
the spot as watchdogs of democracy, although - like interna-
tional observers - they are often ill equipped for their role. The
South African example of responsible reporting in the transi-
tion period is not easily duplicated elsewhere in Africa. South
Africa's media infrastructure and its relatively well-established
tradition of editorial autonomy is probably unrivalled in Africa.
In other countries, such as Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s,
the media did not serve as monitors of democracy but as spoil-
crs, propagating ethnic hate speech which contributcd to the
general atmosphere of heightened polarization. Journalists are
of course not all brave Davids, locked in a courageous battle
with the power-holding Goliaths. Although they like to portray
themselves as watchdogs of the public interest, they can be as
selfish and irresponsible as the much-maligned politicians. But
if African countries are to embark on processes of democratiza-
tion, African media will have to come into their own, moving
beyond the familiär stereotypes of praise singer of the ruler or
unashamed propagandist for the Opposition.
PHASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION
Literature on democratization typically distinguishes three
phascs in the process: origins, transition and consolidation.
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The first multi-party elections are then seen as the crucial
part of the transition phase. The role of international ob-
servers is usually limited to this phase. Media do not only
follow the process throughout, they are also an intrinsic part
of it: the watchdog doubles as an actor. In the first part of this
chapter, we have examined the role of media as monitors of
elections. Here we turn to the media as actors in the fray:
how have the media fared in their broader role as agents of
democratization?
Literature on the role of the media in democratization
processes is scarce. As Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot note in their
survey of the literature, most publications focus on obstacles
encountered by the independent media rather than on their
role in opening up the political arena (1995: 47).4 In the few ex-
ceptions to this rule, the authors generally believe that the role
of the media has been underestimated (Randall 1993;
Sandbrook 1996).
Although media rarely had a triggering role in the start of
the democratization process, they caused an indispensable
snowballing effect. In some countries, as in Kenya, Malawi and
Tanzania, media were also instrumental in the first phase, for-
mulating demands for an opening up of the one-party state
before the political Opposition had regrouped into political
parties. In Malawi, where no independent press had survived
Banda's dictatorship, public debate was fuelled by newspapers
which were faxed from Zambia in order to circumvent the
censors. In Zimbabwe, which so far has not made the transition
towards genuine multi-party elections, independent media -
and in a few exceptional instances even the state-controlled
media - have exposed corruption by state and party officials,
land grabbing and tampering with the electoral rules. In some
cases, exposures in the press resulted in the dismissals of gov-
ernment ministers or the restitution of farms or other assets.
As in Malawi, new technology makes life easier for journalists
and more difficult for censors. A report compiled by the
Catholic Commission for Justicc and Peace on the massacres
perpetrated by the Zimbabwean army in Matabeleland in the
mid-1980s was not published in Zimbabwe, because of its sensi-
tive nature. It was, however, leaked to the Mail and Guardian in
Johannesburg, which not only published abstracts from the
report, but put the füll text of the report on Internet. Via the
MandG's Internet site, the report found its way to the media in
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Zimbabwe. In Benin, outgoing president Mathieu Kérékou even
blamed the press for his election defeat.
Referring more to Latin America than to Africa, Randall
notes:
Though the national media themselves rarely played a 'trig-
gering' role, in a Situation in which populär protest or Opposi-
tion demands were already beginning to mount, they could
widen awareness of issues and help put some kind of frame
on events. They could mobilize and orchestrale populär
protest. By deepening and accelerating political communica-
tion in this way they significantly added to the pressures on
the authorities. (Randall 1993: 636)
Even if they were not instrumental in the first phase, media
played an indispensable role in the next phase. In the African
context, few - if any - countries can be said to have progressed
to the third phase: consolidation.
Both Sandbrook and Randall distinguish between the role of
domestic media and the impact of international media.
Domestic media did not play a vital role in the political open-
ings of the early 1990s. In the nascent phase of political liberal-
ization, it was actually the international mass media that
helped crystallize Opposition to authoritarian and often inept
governments. Images of the fall of dictators - and their statues
- in Eastern Europe had a powerful impact on African audi-
ences. The message was that military coups and civil war were
not the only methods available to gct rid of autocrats: they
could be removed rclatively peacefully by populär mobilization.
In several countries, including Zaire, the government prohib-
ited the transmission of television pictures of the execution of
Nicolae Ceaucescu, the much-feared Rumanian dictator. The
growth of short-wave radio, satellite television and fax ma-
chines undermined government control over Information.
Media in Africa did not initiale the democratie opening, bul the
idea caughl on by contagion, in which media played a crucial
role (Sandbrook 1996: 83).
After decades of one-party rule, repression and harassmenl,
the indigenous media were not in a fit state to take ihe lead as
champions of democracy. Moreover, a sizeable part of the print
media and almost all ihe audio-visual media were controlled by
edilors who failhfully implemented the role of transmission belt
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of the ruling elite. But in several African countries the press
was never fully reduced to the role of praise singer of the presi-
dent and his party, or of the military dictatorship. Among the
remarkable features of the political thaw in many African coun-
tries is the impressive number of independent publications
which sprang up almost overnight and the eagerness of a
news-starved readership which devoured the new titles. In
Cameroon, the number of newspapers and magazines increased
from about 15 prior tojanuary 1990, to nearly 100 in 1993. In
the same period, the circulation of the government-owned
Cameroon Tribune dropped from about 30,000 to 5,000 (Takougang
1994).
Some of this boom was just transient. Many titles collapsed
within one or two years because their owners concentrated
solely on the editorial message of the paper and neglected to
look into economie viability. After the first outburst of enthusi-
asm, circulations declined because the readership lost interest.
Nevertheless, the present media landscape in Africa shows
much more diversity than ever before.
BEVOND PRAISE SINGERS AND RABBLE-ROUSERS
Like political parties, independent media have a hard time in
defining their role in the process of political democratization.
The 'all or nothing' nature of African politics results either in
docility or extreme polarization. Ruling parties are inclined to
marginalize the Opposition. Opposition parties are not geared
to the role of loyal Opposition: rather than formulating an alter-
native political programme, they set out to subvert parliamen-
tary procedures.
The news media are caught up in much the same game: they
tend to be either docile mouthpieces of the government or
scandal-mongering rabble-rousers who are not overly concerned
about the accuracy of their stories as long as they exposé the
outrageous deeds of the rulers. Freed from the strait-jacket of
developmental journalism, in which media were relegated to
the role of tools in the hands of the ruling elite which suppos-
edly carried the heavy responsibility of architects of nation-
building, newspapers plunged enthusiastically in the political
arena. Like the political parties, they were ill prepared for their
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new freedom. The flaws of the African news media have come
up for much criticism: they are branded as unprofessional, irre-
sponsible, sensationalist, partisan and venal. One Cameroonian
journalist likened the role of the independent press to that of a
house-fly: 'It has a habit of being around when things start
stinking. So, what better then can one expect from the press in
a Cameroon whcre almost everything has been stinking for over
fortyyears' (Takougang 1994: 14).
There are obvious limitations to the role of the media as
agents of democratization. In a predominantly rural continent
afflicted by poverty and illiteracy, many citizens do not have
access to mass media. As Kwame Karikari has noted, the press
in Africa is urban-centred and has an elite orientation. Very few
newspapers target an audience of workers and peasants. The
re-emerging press in Africa remains an elite institution. The
use of colonial languages excludes the majority of the popula-
tion. Language is the most obvious limitation on the press as an
effective medium for populär involvement in mass communica-
tion (Karikari 1993). Radio of course has more potential as a
medium well suited to reach both the urban poor and rural
peasants. It is cheaper and more accessible than print media,
but remains state controlled in many African countries. Where
the airwaves are opened up for other broadcasters, it is often
only for commercial stations where populär participation is
limited to phoning in with requests for the listeners' favourite
music.
Whatever their shortcomings, media are indispensable to the
democratie process. Will the media in Africa be able to fulfil
the role of monitors of democracy and agents of democratiza-
tion, in view of the domestic political and economie Situation,
the international setting and wavering donor support?
Mass media in Africa are confronted with an impressive
range of constraints, ranging from government restrictions,
extra-institutional harassment, small readership markets, a
limited economie base, and the poor state of the media industry
itself. Although the 1990s saw an unprecedented blossoming of
new publications, the revival of the independent press is
fraught with dangers. While most authors point to a relaxation
of controls on the media, the picture is by no means rosy.
Kenneth Best, the former publisher of the Daily Observer which
appeared first in Monrovia and then in Banjul, and who was
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subsequently forced to leave the Gambia, even stated that
'media practitioners and media organisations in Africa have
never known more repression and brutality than what we are
facing today'. Lawsuits and licensing of media publications or
journalists have become more widespread than before, while
another old weapon against journalists - murdcr - took more
victims than at any other time in history. In 1994 alone, Africa
lost some 80 journalists, more than all the media people killed
in the Second World War (Best 1997: 31).
In an eloquent pica for press freedom as a core condition for
sustainable democratization, Peter Takirambudde gives an
overview of the legal obstacles facing the prcss in various African
countries. In his view, democratization cannot survive in circum-
stances wherein the press remains largely unfree. 'Sustaincd de-
mocratization would rcquire a supportive environment in which
a critical tradition and freedom of expression predominate.
These elements are conspicuously lacking in most of the emerg-
ing "democracies"' (Takirambudde 1995: 20). Media freedom can
only be revived if African states make the transition from patri-
monialism to constitutionalism: the arbitrary powers of the
rulers need to be replaced by the rule of law, an impersonal, im-
partial and predictable rule that protects the rights of all citi-
zens. In a democratie society, media are indispensable as a
counterbalancing institution. Takirambudde deals with both
formal and informal repression, censorship and self-censorship.
Much of the current discussion on the role of the media
focuses on the relationship between the state and the media.
The state is singled out as the main obstacle for a free press,
both because of repressive practices and because the state is
the owner of the majority of daily newspapers and the vast ma-
jority of radio and television stations. Rather neglected in the
current debate are the constraints of the market. Political libcr-
alization has created more space for independent media. But
what have been the effects of economie liberalization?
Takirambudde believes that, in the long run, the restructuring
of African economies towards market Systems may hateh a large
and powerful entrepreneurial middle class that would believe
strongly in individual liberty and would increasingly assert thcir
rights against the state. Thus, in the long term, economie liber-
alization would contribute significantly to the crcation of self-
sustaining environment for media freedom.
70 Election Observation and Democratïzation in Africa
In the short run, the impact of Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) and economie liberalization is more am-
bivalent. Liberalization of imports and abolition of exchange
controls has enabled media to import their own newsprint and
equipment, thus robbing the government of one instrument of
control. But the consequences of SAPs for the purchasing power
of urban residents have impactcd negatively on their ability to
buy newspapers as well as on advertising budgets. As a rule of
thumb, advertising accounts for at least two-thirds of newspa-
per revenue. One intended effect of SAPs is a redistribution of
income from the cities to the rural arcas: this is potentially
harmful for newspapers. The bulk of their readership is urban
based. Advertisers are only interested in a readership with pur-
chasing power. Therefore, if independent media are totally at
the mercy of market forces, it is difficult to sustain media diver-
sity and to reach audiences which hold little attraction for
advertisers.
The inherent risk of the free-market system is that media
becomc hooked on the consumer market rather than on the
needs of citizens. For this reason, several European countries,
including Swedcn and the Netherlands, have instituted various
methods of subsidizing the media, ranging from low tax tariffs
to straightforward (tcmporary) subsidies. Particularly devastat-
ing for the press in Africa has been the steep rise in the price of
newsprint on the world market, which has incrcased by some
30 to 40 per cent over the past years. Newsprint is the single
biggest expenditure for African newspapers. Many newspapers
have been forced to peg their circulation at a fixed number, not
because of lack of demand but because of the prohibitive costs
of newsprint. In the past, various organizations - such as
UNESCO and Ganadian NGOs - used to subsidize paper pur-
chases for educational and news media purposes. But in the
present market-oriented environment, subsidies are out of
fashion.
What part can the international community play in enabling
independent media to fulfil their role as monitors of democ-
racy? Support can be given in various ways: advocacy, material
assistance (both to individual media and to help create an
enabling environment for a free press), training, and political
conditionality.
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Organizations for human rights, press freedom and journal-
ists' organizations have been active in the sphere of advocacy,
but their activities are largely limited to supporting individual
journalists who have run foul of the authorities. Gonceivably,
there is also a role for international solidarity in supporting
campaigns for legal reforms conducted by African media orga-
nizations. One clear example is the current battle in many
African countries between the state that wants to maintain its
monopoly over broadcasting, and media organizations that
dcmand the opening of the airwaves to independent broadcast-
ers. Assistance to individual media projects is channelled
through various NGOs, such as the Communication Assistance
Foundation in the Netherlands. But with less than l per cent of
the total budget of the Dutch Minister for Development
Cooperation allocated to media in the Third World, there is
scope for improvement.
Assistance can be given to individual newspapers or radio sta-
tions, but can also be used to create an environment in which
newspapers can survive and thrive. Subsidy schemcs for
newsprint could be a temporary measure to facilitate the takc-
off of newspapers. Publishers can also pool resources and set up
a joint import scheme which will enablc thcm to buy newsprint
at a discount, as the Senegalese publishers are doing with the
help of the Canadian embassy (Best 1997: 33). In countries
where the only printing press is controlled by the governmcnt
or the ruling party, the provision of printing presses would
make a huge difference. There is a massive need for training.
Journalists are often poorly trained, ill paid, have a low social
status and therefore often feel insecure in their battles with au-
thorities. If independent media are to fulfil their watchdog role
in emerging democracies, they will have to bccome more profes-
sional. Only media with a rcputation of reliability and accuracy
will be taken seriously by the ruling elites. Among the jour-
nalistic profession in Africa, it is widely and emphatically recog-
nized that journalism and newspapcr management are in need
of more professionalism. Training needs are diverse, ranging
from training in journalistic skills and ethics to ncwspaper
management, advertising, marketing, technical expertise with
regard to printing equipment, computer technology, desk top
Publishing.
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More contcntious is the case for political conditionality.
Takirambudde notes that political conditionality has been em-
ployed as a tooi to promote democracy, but that this tooi has
not been very cffective because of insufficient down-to-carth
links betwecn political conditionality and the achievement of
'real' human rights, such as press frcedom. Rather than on
global and imprecise demands, political conditionality should
be more surgically targeted on rigorous respect for freedom of
the media (Takirambudde 1995: 53).
Professional journalism does not mean unpartisan journal-
ism. Like the media in Europe, media in Africa will have their
own socio-political profile and their own political preferences.
There is nothing wrong with that, as long as it does not result
in distortion of the news. Media are partisan; but so are ob-
servers. The report of the European Union mission to the South
African elcctions freely recognizes that it is always difficult to
find neutral observers. Explaining why 'monitoring' was pre-
ferrcd above the more interventionist mode of election 'observ-
ing', the report states: 'The many national and international
observcr groups that werc present, brought together people
from a wide varicty of backgrounds: with a range of political
commitments and often patchy knowledge of the electoral regu-
lations. It is preferable to have them play the unobtrusive role
of observing rathcr than intervcning in the process' (European
Union Election Unit 1994: 44).
CONCLUSION
International advisers and monitors can play a useful role in
countries cmerging from a past of authoritarian rule. Their
duties and responsibilities ought to be clearly defined. Their
rcports should not be inspired by the political agenda of
their country of origin. A clear distinction between peace moni-
tors and election observers is crucial in order to avoid an un-
hcalthy confusion between the interests of political stability and
the requirements of democracy. In any case, the role of inter-
national observers is limited to the transition phase and to a
limited sphere of activities, such as clections. The broader
democratie process requires 'monitors of democracy', but this
role is best left to local actors, notably independent media. This
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is therefore not a plea for either/or monitors or media: both
have a role to play. But while much attention has recently been
given to various forms of international involvement and Inter-
vention, the role of the media in Africa is much neglected.
The donor community is narrowly focused on multi-party
elections as the litmus test of democratization. A political con-
ditionality which singles out multi-party elections as the crucial
element, without taking account of the wider environment,
risks being counter-productive. Indispensable for sustainable
democratization are independent media. Governments - not
only in Africa - have a tendency to dismiss media as 'irrcspons-
ible' and therefore not very relevant to the democratie process.
Tension between governments and media is howevcr a normal
condition in democracies. As Lord Jacobson once said when
opening a debate in the House of Lords on the state of the
press (cited in Grant and Egner 1989: 263): 'Relations between
politicians and the press have dcteriorated, are deteriorating
... and should on no account be allowed to improve.'
NOTES
1. In this article, the terms 'observer' and 'monitor' are used interchange-
ably.
2. Van Cranenburgh 1997; Sandbrook 1996; Ellis 1996; Hyden 1996; Shaw
and Maclean 1996; Young 1997; Abbink 1995. For an extensive survey
of the literature on democratization up to 1995, see Buijtenhuijs and
Rijnierse 1993 and Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot 1995.
3. Lecture by Mr J. de Ruyter for the Nederlands Genootschap voor
Internationale Zaken (Netherlands Society for International Relations),
The Hague, 14June 1994.
4. Some recent books on the subject are: Bourgault 1995; Hachten 1993;
Tudesq 1995.
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